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COMMON LAW AND PROXY MARRIAGES
Under the canon law and later at common law, marriage was a
civil contract which required no formal ceremony,' and such contract
"per verba de praesenti" did not require consummation but "ipso facto
et ipso jure" constituted the relation of man and wife.2 This doc-
trine of the canon law was abrogated by the Council of Trent (1563)
which required matrimonial consents thereafter to be exchanged in
the presence of an ordained priest and at least two witnesses. But
the Council of Trent was never accepted in England and, thus, had no
effect upon the common law of marriage.3 It would appear, therefore,
that in all those states which adopted this part of the common law
of England, and which still recognize the common law marriage,4 the
doctrine expressed in the old maxim "consensus et non concubitas
facit nuptias" would be followed. It must be admitted, however, that
much confusion is found in the cases as a result of the failure on
the part of many of the courts to properly distinguish between the
necessary elements of a common law marriage and the evidence re-
quired to establish the existence of the marriage.5 While many
1. According to the prevailing opinion in Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. and
Fin. 534 (1844) a marriage contracted without the presence of
an ordained clergyman was never valid by the English common
law. But the competent scholars believe this view to be without
historical foundation.
2. See 2 Kent's Commentaries (13th ed. 1884) *87; 2 Greenleaf,
"Evidence" (16th ed. 1899) §460; 1 Bishop, "Marriage, Divorce
and Separation" (1891) §315; 18 R. C. L. 394; 35 Am. Jur. 201.
3. Proper informal marriages by consent were rendered illegal in
England by the Marriage Act of 1753.
4. It may be said with some certainty that common law marriages
are still recognized in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. In
some of the states validity is doubtful, as is the case in the
District of Columbia . See Vernier, "American Family Laws"
(1931) 106.
5. The courts of some of the states which recognize common law
marriage require varying combinations of "essential elements"
to establish the marriage. They fail to recognize that the con-
sentual contract to presently assume the marriage relation is
the only essential element, and require cohabitation, or both
cohabitation and reputation, in addition to the contract.
Am example of the confusion between what constitutes and what
is necessary to prove the common law marriage is found in the
recent case of Schilling v. Parsons, - Ind. App. -, 36 N.E.(2d) 957 (1941). The court held that the contract, if written,
or if oral and witnessed, must be followed by cohabitation to
result in a marriage status; and, if the contract is oral and not
witnessed, it must be followed by cohabitation plus an additional
factor-a holding out by the parties of their marriage status
to at least such part of the community where they Hve as is
made up of their acquaintances, neighbors, and relatives. For
a criticism of this case see Note (1942) 11 Fordham L. Rev. 90.
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courts have insisted upon cohabitation, or both cohabitation and rep-
utation, in addition to the contract to establish the marriage relation,
the weight of American authority is in accord with the old common
law rule and may be stated thus: In the absence of special statutory
requirements, a common law marriage is constituted by a contract
"per verba de praesenti" even though it is not followed by cohabita-
tion.6
A distinction has been made, quite logically, between contracts
"per verba de praesenti" and contracts "per verba de futuro," in the
latter type it being held that consummation is a factor requisite to
establishing the marriage relation.7 This view, shared by eminent
legal scholars, is well expressed by Chancellor Kent: "If the contract
be made 'per verba de praesenti,' and remains without cohabitation,
or if made 'per verba de futuro,' and be followed by consummation,
it amounts to a civil marriage in the absence of all civil regulations
to the contrary, and which the parties (being competent as to age and
consent) cannot dissolve, and it is equally binding as if made in
'facie ecclesial.' ,,8
In 1919 a majority of the states recognized the validity of informal
marriages. 9 Today only twenty-one10 of the states recognize common
law marriage, and it is significant that in recent years two of our
largest eastern states, New York and New Jersey, have passed stat-
utes abolishing them."' Such marriages, real and alleged, complicate
the work of administrative agencies, notably that of the Social Se-
curity Board, 12 state industrial boards, and the United States Treas-
6. Mathewson v. Phoenix Iron Foundary, 20 Fed. 281 (D.C.R.I. 1884);
Scroggins v. State, 32 Ark. 205 (1877); Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo.
271, 215 Pac. 128 (1923); Chaves v. Chaves, 79 Fla. 602, 84 So.
672 (1920); Love v. Love, 185 Iowa 930, 171 N. W. 257 (1919);
Carey et al. v. Hulett, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31 (1896); Davis
v. Stouffer, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282 (1908); Bey v. Bey,
83 N. J. Eq. 239, 90 AtI. 684 (1914); Craig's Estate, 273 Pa. 530,
117 AtI. 221 (1922). See also Note (1932) 66 U.S.L. Rev. 165. In
the interesting case of Great Northern R. R. v. Johnson, 254
Fed. 683 (C.C.A. 8th, 1918) a marriage was held valid where a
woman residing in Missouri married a man residing in Minnesota
by the interchange of written contracts stating a present inten-
tion of assuming the marriage relation.
7. Love v. Love, 185 Iowa 930, 171 N. W. 257 (1919); Carey et al.
v. Hulett, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N. W. 31 (1896); Davis v. Stouffer,
132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282 (1908); Bey v. Bey, 83 N. J.
Eq. 239, 90 Atl. 684 (1914).
8. 2 Kent's Commentaries (13th ed. 1884) *87. See also 2 Green-
leaf, "Evidence" (16th ed. 1899) §460.
9. See Note (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 848.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. N. Y. Dom. Rel. Law (1941) §11; N. J. Stat. Ann. (1939) tit. 37,
§-10.
12. See Billig and Lynch, "Common Law Marriages n Minnesota, A
Problem in Social Security" (1938) 22 Minn. L. Rev. 177; Billig
and Lynch, "Social Security Encounters Common Law Marriage
in North Carolina" (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rev. 255.
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ury Department, Bureau of War Risk Insurance. 3 While the social
interests advanced by the abolition of informal marriages have been
received favorably by some legislatures, the social interests to be
served in continuing informal marriages should not be overlooked.
A marriage problem of current interest due to the war is the
validity of marriage by proxy-that is, a marriage in which one
(or both) of the parties is represented by an agent. Such marriages
were looked upon as lawful in the continental countries prior
to the Council of Trent (1563), but, thereafter for a time, they had
no meaning because they did not obviate the necessity of another
celebration between the parties themselves. 14 Long since, however, the
canon law has been superseded by civil marriage acts in many of the
continental countries and proxy marriages are permitted in some of
them. Marriages by proxy were probably valid at common law but
are not possible today in England under the modern English mar-
riage acts. 5
In the United States there is almost no legislation on the sub-
ject,16 and whether such marriage is possible at common law is doubt-
ful. The reported cases are almost as meager as the legislation,
though in a few cases the validity of a marriage by proxy is indicated
by way of dictum. In Ex parte Suzanna 7 the plaintiff, a Portu-
guese woman, married her fianc6, then living in Pennsylvania. The
marriage ceremony was performed in Portugal (where proxy mar-
riages are valid), the bridegroom being represented by a friend. The
plaintiff's entry into the United States was permissible under the
immigration laws only if she were legally married. In holding that
her marriage was valid, the court said, "There is nothing in the laws
of Pennsylvania which I have been able to discover requiring the
personal presence of the parties at the ceremony, and . . . the
proxy marriage celebrated in Portugal is valid in Pennsylvania."'8
In United States ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, Immigration Commission-
er,19 the same situation faced the court except that the marriage was
celebrated in Turkey and the bridegroom was a resident of Louisiana
where marriage by procuration is specifically prohibited by statute.20
The court held the marriage valid in spite of the statute.2'
13. See Treas. Doc. 2834 (1919); see also Note (1941) 15 Temp. L. Q.
541, 542.
14. Brissaud, "History of French Private Law" (Continental Legal
History Series 1912) 103, n. 5. But see Lorenzen, "Marriage
by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws" (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 473,
476.
15. See 1 Vernier, "American Family Laws" (1931) 143.
16. Only one state has specifically outlawed proxy marriages. The
Civil Code of Louisiana, Article 109, provides that "No marriage
can be contracted or celebrated by procuration."
17. 295 Fed. 713 (D.C. Mass. 1924).
18. 295 Fed. 713, 717 (D.C. Mass. 1924). Accord, Silva v. Tillinghast,
Commissioner, 36 F. (2d) 801 (D.C. Mass. 1929).
19. 12 F. (2d) 927 (E. D. La. 1925).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. The court held that the statute only applied to marriages in
Louisiana.
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In those states which recognize the common law marriage and
require only a contract "per verba de praesenti" to constitute it, such
contract is a civil one and the general rules of contract and agency
seem applicable. It logically follows, then, that in those states a
proxy marriage by informal contract is valid.22 Obviously, in those
states where consummation in addition to the contract is required
to establish the marriage, it could not be effected through an agent.
Relative to contracts of marriage by statutory solemnization, logic
would seem to favor their validity when entered into through an agent
if the statutory provisions do not specifically require the personal
presence of the parties. In such case there is no act which is pe-
culiarly personal to the principal.
There is comparatively little interest in the problem of marriage
by proxy in peace-time. In time of war, however, men in the armed
forces frequently desire to marry their fianc~es at home and the
validity of such marriages assumes great importance. During World
War I it is interesting to note that the Judge Advocate General of
the Army issued an opinion that soldiers of the American Expeditionary
Forces could not be legally married by proxy to American women
who remained in the United States.23 During the present war the
validity of proxy marriages has apparently not been before the courts.
The newspapers have reported an unusual marriage by telephone be-
tween a woman residing in Oklahoma and a soldier in Honolulu.24
But the validity of this type of marriage was denied by the Assistant
Attorney General of Missouri in his reply to an inquiry by a woman
who had written from New Mexico asking if Missouri would allow
her marriage to a soldier in Hawaii by telephone.25
France, Italy, and Hungary have by governmental decree per-
mitted proxy and other unusual types of marriage. The Fascist party
executives have arranged with the ecclesiastical and Italian civil au-
thorities for marriages by radio between soldiers at the front and
their fianc6es at home. 26 In France27 and Hungary, 28 fianc6es of
22. See Lorenzen, "Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws"
(1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 413.
23. Opinions of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Sept. 9, 1918.
24. N. Y. Times, July 6, 1942, p. 12, col. 5. By Associated Press from
Clinton, Okla. "Vows exchanged over 3500-mile telephone hook-
up united in marriage yesterday Miss Elaine Dougherty and En-
sign Harold E. Fry, now on duty in Honolulu."
25. N. Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1942, p. 44, col. 4. The As~sstant Attorney
General's answer concluded, "I have diligently searched our law
and have failed to find any provision to authorize a marriage in
the manner as described in your letter."
26. N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1942, p. 8, col. 7. The report by telephone
from Berne, Switzerland stated that the arrangement was an
improvement on marriage by proxy which was 'a current prac-
tice in most armies during the first World War." The ceremony
follows as swiftly as possible after publication of the banns. Then
when the mayor pronounces the couple to be legally wed and the
priest blesses them the bridegroom at the front listens in on a
special broadcast for his benefit.
27. N. Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1940, p. 4, col. 7.
28. N. Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1943, p. 12, col. 3.
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soldiers killed in action are permitted to marry their dead sweethearts
by complying with statutory registration proceedings. This type of
legislation is designed to legitimize children and facilitate widows'
pensions. While marriage by proxy is not permitted in Germany,
French war prisoners interned in prison camps in Germany and in
occupied France may marry their fianc6es at home by proxy.29
By purely logical reasoning, the validity of proxy marriages in
America might be upheld (1) where the marriage is by consentual
contract in states which recognize common law marriage, the contract
being one in which the parties mutually agree in the present tense
to assume the relation of man and wife, and (2) where the marriage
is by statutory solemnization in states where the statutory provisions
do not expressly require the personal presence of the parties.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARKING METER ORDINANCE
Appellants, owners of business property in the city of Marion,
appealed from the superior court, contesting the constitutionality of
a parking meter ordinance adopted by the city.' Held, that the ordin-
ance did not deprive the appellants of their property without due
process of law, and that it was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. Andrews et al. v. City of Marion et al., - Ind. - , 47
N.E. (2d) 968 (1943).
The city had no specific statutory authority to enact such an
ordinance, 2 but in upholding the ordinance the court relied on the
general statutory authority delegated to the municipalities for the
regulation and control of traffic.3
As members of the general public the appellants have a right
of free and unobstructed passage of the streets, subject of course
to reasonable regulation.4 This common law right, however, does not
include parking, which is a privilege and may be taken away entirely.5
29. N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1941, p. 14, col. 3. (Wired from Paris via
Berlin).
1. In order to alleviate the difficulties caused by parking for long
periods of time, the ordinance authorized the use of parking
meters in the more congested parts of the business streets of the
city.
2. Apparently, only New York has granted specific statutory au-
thority to municipalities. People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 320(1941); Gilsey Building Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Great
Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 694 (1939), aff'd,
16 N.Y.S. (2d) 832 (2d Dep't 1939).
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§47-1827, 47-1828, 48-1407.
4. Teague v. City of Bloomington, 40 Ind. App. 68, 81 N.E. 103
(1907); State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185 (1880); Chicago, Burling-
ton & Quincy R.R. v. Quincy, 136 Ill. 563, 27 N.E. 182 (1891).
And see Dillon, "Municipal Corporations" (5th ed. 1911) §1163.
5. Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P. (2d) 1015 (1937); Village
of Wonenoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W. 755 (1930); In
City of Chicago v. McKinley, 344 Ill. 297, 304, 176 N.E. 261, 264(1931), the court said, "The traveler on the street has no abso-
